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Abstract
The transference theory reduces causation to the transmission (or
regular manifestation) of physical conserved quantities, like energy or
momenta. Although this theory aims at applying to all fields of physics,
we claim that it fails to account for a quantum electrodynamic ef-
fect, viz. the Aharonov-Bohm effect. After having argued that the
Aharonov-Bohm effect is a genuine counter-example for the transfer-
ence theory, we offer a new physicalist approach of causation, ontic
and modal, in which this effect is embedded.
1 Introduction
The transference theory reduces causation to the transmission (or regu-
lar manifestation) of physical conserved quantities, like energy or momenta
(Dowe 2000, Kistler 2006). It is a major physicalist or ontic approach of
causation, an approach that provides an account of causation as a phys-
ical process, based on our best scientific theories. As Dieks emphasizes,
such an account maintains causation in “its rightful place as a category of
physical ontology”(1986, p. 85). This theory of causation presumably ap-
plies to all fields of physics, like classical mechanics, relativistic physics as
well as quantum physics. In particular, quantum electrodynamics is viewed
as exemplifying the transference theory of causation: Interactions between
charged particles and electromagnetic fields can be expressed via exchanges
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of physical quantities via photons. For instance, Salmon (1997), one of the
first defenders of this account, argues for this claim:
According to our best contemporary theory, quantum electro-
dynamics, the electromagnetic force is mediated by exchanges
of photons. This means, in my terms, that whenever a photon
is emitted or absorbed by a charged particle we have a causal
interaction. Thus a charged particle undergoing acceleration in
an electromagnetic field consists of a series of causal processes
standing between frequent causal interaction. (Salmon 1997, p.
465. Our emphases)
In this paper, we nevertheless claim that the transference theory fails to
account for a quantum electrodynamic effect, which is the Aharonov-Bohm
(AB) effect. We have to carefully pay attention to this effect. First, it is not
a singular effect but is, more generally, a particular case of class of different
quantum phenomena (Berry 1984). More to the point, as we will argue for,
the AB effect is a paradigmatic case of causal phenomena. This paper thus
aims at showing that the AB effect is a counter-example for the transference
theory in its current form but, also, at offering a new physicalist approach
of causation in which this effect is embedded.
The AB effect is a quantum effect showing that an electronic interfer-
ence pattern can be modified via an electromagnetic field that is completely
shielded from the electrons themselves. This effect, predicted by Aharonov
and Bohm (1959), has been well confirmed by experiments (Chambers 1960,
Tonomura et al 1986), and has found various applications with materials
(van Oudenaarden et al. 1998, Bachtold et al. 1999, Zaric et al. 2004). Such
a phenomenon raises important questions for the foundations of physics.
Healey (1997) has discussed in what sense this phenomenon exhibits non-
locality and non-separability. On the other hand, Liu (1994, 1996) has ar-
gued for the reality of wave packets based on the AB effect. In this paper,
we are interested in the AB effect with regard to the concept of causation
and the transference theory. To our knowledge, there is a single discussion
on the AB and its consequences on physical causation (Zangari 1992). How-
ever, it does not explicitly tackle the transference theory. Zangari rather
defends that the notion of potential has to be added to account for physical
causation. Although we agree with his approach, it is a worthy project to
investigate in what sense the AB effect makes the transference theory con-
troversial, and to show how it is possible to reconsider this theory in order
to account for this phenomenon. Our project is not thus to reject merely
the transference theory based on the analysis of the AB effect. Although
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we argue that the transference theory is not capable of accounting for a
paradigmatic case of causation, we suggest how this theory could be revised
for that purpose. We propose a view of physical causation based on the core
notions of propagation and interaction.
The paper is structured as follows. First, we outline the main claims of
the transference theory and sketch some possible issues (Section 2). We then
turn to the AB effect by arguing that it cannot be a case of the transference
theory (Section 3). Although the transference theory fails to account for this
phenomenon, we then argue that the AB is nevertheless a paradigmatic case
of causation (Section 4). Finally, we suggest how to reconsider the theory of
transference, and offer a new physicalist approach of causation that includes
the AB effect (Section 5).
2 The transference theory and possible counter-
examples
Let us begin by introducing the transference theory and then its usual
counter-examples as discussed in the literature.
2.1 The transference theory
According to the transference theory, causation reduces to the transmission
(or regular manifestation) of a physical quantity from an event A to an event
B. This theory comes from ideas of Aronson (1971a, 1971b) who suggests
that “Prior to the time of the occurrence of B, the body that makes con-
tact with the effect object possesses a quantity (e.g., velocity, momentum,
kinetic energy, heat, etc.) which is transferred to the effect object (when
contact is made) and manifested as B”(1971b, p. 422). Aronson makes
clear that causation corresponds to the transference of a physical quantity.
However, such a quantity is not clearly identified: it can be “heat” as well as
“velocity”, which are very different from a physical point of view since, for
instance, heat can be dissipated and velocity is not a conserved quantity in
elastic collisions. Fair (1979) offers a similar account of causation but focuses
on “energy” and/or “momentum” as transferred quantities. The identifica-
tion of these quantities comes from physicists’ empirical investigations, as
empirical facts.1
1It should be noted that the transference theory is just a new take on a old debate about
modality, namely how to understand metaphysically the basic concepts of propagation and
production (Schrenk forthcoming).
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On the other hand, Salmon (1977, 1980, 1984) also provides a physical-
ist – even though quite different – theory of causation, the theory of mark
transmission. In this approach, there are two distinct causal ingredients.
On the one hand, there are causal processes that transmit marks, i.e., prop-
agate some quantities, sometimes defined as processes that transmit energy
(1984, p. 146). On the other hand, there are causal interactions, which cor-
respond to the intersection of two causal processes. Following these different
approaches, Dowe (1992a, 1992b, 2000) offers a unified theory, namely the
conserved quantity theory, which is defined as follows:
The conserved quantity theory can be expressed in just two
propositions:
CQ1. A causal process is a world line of an object that possesses
a conserved quantity.
CQ2. A causal interaction is an intersection of world lines that
involves exchange of a conserved quantity. (2000, p. 90)
A causal interaction, like the collision between two billard balls, is thus de-
fined via the exchange of conserved physical quantities, viz. energy and
momentum. Similarly, Kistler (1998, 2006) argues for a transference the-
ory based on the notion of transfer (or regular manifestation) of physical
conserved quantities between distant events. His theory is defined by the
statement (S) as follows:
(S) Two events c and e are related as cause and effect if and
only if there is at least one conserved quantity P , subject to
a conservation law and exemplified in c and e, a determinate
amount of which is transferred between c and e. (2006, p. 26)
By “transference”, it is explicitly meant that “an amount A is said to be
transferred between c and e, if and only if this very amount is present in both
events” (Kistler 2006, p. 26). Despite several differences between Dowe’s
and Kistler’s approaches, causation is defined in both cases as the transfer
of a physical conserved quantity. Therefore, the decisive rebuttal for this
theory would be to exhibit a paradigmatic case of causal relations between
two events that would not involve any transference of conserved quantity.
2.2 Possible counter-examples
There have been many critical discussions against the transference theory
of causation. Most of them have consisted in raising counter-examples in
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order to argue that the transference of conserved quantities is neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition for causation. For instance, counter-
examples based on causation by disconnection (Schaffer 2000) have been
raised. In those cases, although two events C and E are causally related
– at least in a counterfactual sense – there is no exchange of a conserved
quantity because of a lack of intrinsic connection between C and E. This
could happen when (i) something prevents the exchange of a quantity –
energy for instance – between two events C ′ and E, and (ii) C is an event
that releases this prevention. As a result, C causes E although there is no
transference of conserved quantities between C and C ′. An paradigmatic
example is a weight that accelerates because the stretched spring to which
it is attached is unblocked. The usual reply for this kind of objection is to
deny that those cases are genuinely causal. In particular, Aronson argues
for the distinction between a cause, which involves transference of conserved
quantity and an occasion, which is only “a condition that enables the cause
to act”(1971a, p. 425). The release of a prevention is not a cause but what
makes possible the cause to act.
Conversely, it has been argued that conserved quantities can be trans-
mitted without characterizing a causal relation. This objection comes with
misconnection (Dowe 2000, p. 147, Schaffer 2001). For instance, there is
transmission of a certain quantity of billard chalk between a pool cue and a
billard ball. However, this exchange of conserved quantity is not relevant for
a causal relation between the motion of the cue and the motion of the ball.
One can find different kinds of misconnections, viz. micro-connections and
pseudo-connections. Against that kind of counter-example, it can be argued
that the quantity of billard chalk involved is of such a negligible proportion
to be regarded as causally relevant. It can also be argued that the line of
billard chalk and the line of the billard balls moving on the table might be
regarded as only coincident (Dowe 2000, chap. 7).
A very different kind of objection consists in paying attention to some
physical phenomena for which the transference theory cannot be applied.
These counter-objections are genuinely grounded in physics. We mention
two important discussions that are relevant for our criticism.2
First, the case of quantum EPR experiments has been extensively dis-
cussed. In a nutshell, such experiments exhibit correlations between the
measures of two entangled particules separated by a space-like interval, i.e.,
without any possibility of the transmission of a physical signal, and a fortiori,
2Reuger (1998) has also provided a criticism grounded in physics based on a case in
general relativity.
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any possibility of the transference of a physical quantity. The defenders of
the transference theories try to overcome such issues in different ways. For
instance, Dowe (2000) defends a backwards causality model, which relies on
the hypothesis that “act of measurement on particle A brings about causal
influence that propagates backwards-in-time to the source of the two parti-
cles”(2000, 185). In that case, the price to defend the transference theory
is to endorse controversial claims about backwards-in-time processes. Nev-
ertheless, although the EPR experiments are viewed as problematic with
respect to the transference theory, the other option is merely to deny such
phenomena as causal:
The defender of the transference theory can argue that the cor-
relation at a distance shown by the EPR phenomenon is not an
instance of causation [...]
The scientific debate on the explanation of this phenomenal is
not yet over [...] So far, nothing prevents us from thinking that
quantum mechanical correlations at a distance do not give rise
to causal relations, but are a form of non-local and non-causal
determination. Therefore, we can keep claiming that condition
(S) is both sufficient and necessary. (Kistler 2006, p. 28-29)
In our opinion, although EPR experiments raise issues on causality, they are
not a clearly decisive rebuttal for the transference theory. EPR experiments
are based on quantum entanglement, which makes unclear whether there are
two systems or rather only a single one. We will go back to EPR experiments
in Section 4.
Second, in the context of classical mechanics, Lupher (2009) has pointed
out that systems at equilibrium challenge the conserved quantity theory of
causation (CQTC). He correctly emphasizes that this theory is, by design,
too limited:
The CQTC approach favors dynamical interactions as being causal
interactions. This is evident from the definition of causal inter-
actions involving the exchange of conserved quantities. But this
rules out other types of interactions from counting as causal in-
teractions, namely systems in equilibrium. (2009, p. 78)
For that purpose, he discusses the case of a ring with a mass at the cen-
ter in gravitational equilibrium. There is no conserved quantities which
are transferred between the two systems. Nevertheless, there is an obvious
gravitational causal interaction between the two bodies. As Lupher stresses,
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“the fact that the net forces may sum to zero does not imply that no forces
are present”(2009, p. 79).3 We agree with this objection. It is a genuine
counter-example for the transference theory of causation. Even if our paper
mainly deals with quantum physics, our revised account of the transfer-
ence theory of causation will allow us to represent systems at equilibrium as
causal (see Section 5.2).
The previous objection is however restricted to static physical phenom-
ena. In the next section, we show that a dynamical phenomenon also chal-
lenges the transference theory of causation, which is a quantum phenomenon
different from EPR experiments.
3 The challenge of the Aharonov-Bohm effect
Let us now turn to the AB effect. We argue that this physical phenomenon,
or more precisely the Aharonov-Bohm phase shift, might be a genuine
counter-example to the transference theory of causation. For that purpose,
we first introduce this phenomenon as it is presented in the usual textbooks
and argue that it does not involve any transference of a conserved physical
quantity.
3.1 The Aharonov-Bohm effect
The AB effect is a quantum interference phenomenon with electrons (or any
charged particles) under the influence of an enclosed electromagnetic field.
It is well illustrated by a two-slit experiment (see Figure 1).4 Let us take
such a two-slit experiment with a solenoid located between the two slits and
the screen. The solenoid is perfectly isolated in a such way that there is
a non-zero magnetic field B only into the solenoid and no magnetic field
outside. Electrons are emitted from the source S and pass through two slits
separated by a distance d. A pattern of bright and dark electronic fringes
is observed on a screen at a distance l of the slits. This pattern comes from
the interference between two possible paths for the electrons (path 1 and
path 2) that meet at the point x on the screen.
Under these conditions, let us first assume that there is no solenoid – or
the solenoid is unplugged. In that case, there is a certain pattern of fringes
according to the standard quantum interference phenomenon (See Figure 1,
3Mattingly ironically stresses this point by reporting a quip of a colleague: “the as-
surance that no net forces are present will be cold comfort to a prisoner sentenced to be
drawn and quartered – our victim is torn apart in any case”(2007, p. 904).
4This section is a summary of Healey’s paper (1997, Section 2).
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Original Pattern). Then, let us add a solenoid – or just let us plug in the
solenoid. In that case, the pattern of fringes is modified. This is the AB
effect that corresponds to a shift of the pattern:
Figure 1: Aharonov-Bohm effect. Figure extracted from (Shech 2007).
∆x =
lλ
2pid
e
~
Φ (1)
where λ is the wave length of electrons, e their electric charge, ~ the reduced
Planck constant, and Φ the magnetic flux produced by the solenoid (See
Figure 1, Shifted Pattern).
The shift in the AB effect is explained by a change of the phase of
electrons computed using the potential vector A that crosses the paths of
electrons. When there is no solenoid, the usual difference of phase δ at the
point x due to the two electronic paths 1 and 2 is :
δ =
2pixd
lλ
(2)
Interference fringes on the screen are bright when δ is a multiple of 2pi. Then,
because of the solenoid, there is a vector potential outside the solenoid.
Apparently, this potential vector adds a phase change of the electrons wave
function at the point r by an amount − e~A.dr. The resulting total phase
change along a classical path is thus:
δ = − e
~
∫
A.dr (3)
8
where the integral ranges over the path of electrons. Therefore, the difference
of phase between the two paths from the source S to the screen is:
∆(δ) = δ1 − δ2 =
(
− e
~
∫
1
A.dr
)
−
(
e
~
∫
2
A.dr
)
= − e
~
∮
A.dr (4)
where the last integral is taken on the closed curve corresponding to the sum
of the paths 1 and 2. Then, applying the Stokes theorem to the definition
of the magnetic field as B = ∇×A, one obtains:5
∆(δ) = − e
~
∮
A.dr = − e
~
∫∫
B.dS = − e
~
Φ (5)
Since this difference of phase does not depend on x, it leads to a global shift
of the pattern by the amount:
∆x =
lλ
2pid
∆(δ) =
lλ
2pid
e
~
Φ (6)
3.2 A regular effect without transference of conserved quan-
tities
Although the interference pattern is shifted by the application of an enclosed
magnetic field, and thus a potential vector crossing the electrons’ paths, we
nevertheless claim that this phenomenon does not involve the transfer of
any physical quantity.
First of all, let us focus on the usual physical conserved quantities dis-
cussed in the literature. None of them, viz. momentum, angular momentum,
energy, and spin, are transferred (Olariu & Popescu 1985, p. 358; Zangari
1992, p. 271; Guay 2008a, p. 690). As Liu emphasizes:
Does the [vector] potential have any effect on the expected val-
ues of a quantum object’s observable properties? Does it have
any effect on its average position, momentum, spin, and so on?
Theoretically, the answer is again no. (Liu 1994, p. 994)
The theoretical reason put forth is that all the observables in quantum me-
chanics commute with the components Ax,y,z of the potential vector that
appear in the additional phase change δ = − e~A.dr. Therefore, the time
5We emphasize that this result comes from a first order approximation on the inter-
action between the electrons and the potential vector. For technical details, see (Guay
2004).
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Figure 2: This figure is extracted from (Olariu and Popescu 1985, p. 350). It
represents the electronic interference pattern in a two-slit experiment. In (a) there
is no magnetic field. In (b), there is a magnetic field crossed by electrons. In (c)
there is a magnetic field that is not crossed by electrons (A-B effect).
average value of any physical quantity associated to an observable is not
modified by the potential vector (Liu 1994, p. 994).
Similarly, Olariu and Popescu (1985) claim that the usual conserved
physical quantities are not modified by the potential vector within the AB
effect:
We show in this section that the changes in the average values of
the aforementioned quantities [viz. energy and momenta] depend
on the product of the fields strength times the probability den-
sity, whence we conclude that the average position, momentum,
energy, and angular momentum of a charged particle are not
affected by distributions of enclosed fluxes. (Olariu & Popescu
1985, p. 358)
Their proof is different and more detailed. They explicitly show that the
equations describing the conservation of the kinetic momentum, the kinetic
energy and the angular momentum only require the electromagnetic fields
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E and B.6 The potential vector A only appears in a such a way that it
can be rewritten in terms of electromagnetic fields with respect to the usual
equations between fields and potentials:
E = ∇φ− 1
c
∂A
∂t
B = ∇×A (7)
with φ the electric potential. But, since there is no electromagnetic fields E
and B crossing the paths of electrons, there is no modification of physical
quantities of electrons, viz. energy, momenta, and spin.
In order to stress that any physical quantity is transmitted within the
AB effect, let us contrast the AB effect with a two-slit experiment within a
homogenous magnetic field instead of an enclosed field. Olariu and Popescu
(1985, p. 350) show that the enveloppe of the interference pattern is mod-
ified with a homogenous electromagnetic field whereas it is not with an
enclosed field. Both cases exhibit a shift of the interference pattern, corre-
sponding to an additional phase change due to electromagnetic fields. But
the enveloppe is modified only when electrons pass through a region with
non-zero electromagnetic field (Figure 2). The average position of electrons
is thus modified in the first case and not in the second. This means that no
kinetic momentum or kinetic energy are exchanged in the second case.
None of the usual conserved physical quantities are thus modified within
the AB effect. However, there is a quantity that is known to play a central
role in predicting the AB effect (Wu and Yang 1975, Zangari 1992, Healey
1997, Belot 1998). It is the holonomy, also called the Dirac phase factor
corresponding in the AB effect to:
S(C) = exp
(
−ie/~
∮
C
A(r).dr
)
(8)
It corresponds to the factor of the wave function of the electron “interact-
ing” with the potential vector along the curve C. According to Zangari,
“[i]t therefore seems that the term which correctly characterizes the causal
interaction in the Aharonov-Bohm effect is the phase factor” (1992, p. 269).
Indeed, despite the question of which physical quantity is transmitted within
6For instance, “The conservation equation (1.89) [the equation of conservation at stake]
shows that the average momentum of a charged particle can be modified only by a direct
action of the field strengths. If the distribution of the field strengths is surrounded by
finite barriers which render the probability of the presence of the particle in the region
of the fields very small while keeping the wave function nonsingular, then by tracking
the average of Eq. (1.89) we see that the total kinetic momentum is not changed by
distributions of enclosed electromagnetic fields”(Olariu & Popescu 1985, p. 360).
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the AB effect – if there is any – , there is a debate about which physical
quantity is responsible for the AB effect. While the potential vector is a
quite natural candidate, it cannot be viewed as a physical quantity since it
is not gauge-invariant. In a nutshell, the electromagnetic potentials φ and A
are not well-defined in the sense that they have gauge freedom. This means
that there is a gauge transformation, i.e. the transformation that, for any
smooth enough function f , corresponds to:
A −→ A′ = A+∇f and φ −→ φ′ = φ− ∂f
∂t
(9)
which leaves unchanged the electromagnetic fields E and B. Such a trans-
formation does not produce any physical observable differences. Instead,
the holonomy S(C) is gauge-invariant and therefore can be viewed as the
physical quantity responsible for the AB effect.7 Nevertheless, although the
phase factor S(C) is gauge-invariant, we argue below in Section 5 that it
cannot be viewed as transferred or transmitted, undermining accordingly the
transference theory of causation.
3.3 Is the Aharonov-Bohm phase shift a force-based effect?
Up until now, we have discussed the mainstream explanation of the effect,
the one suggested by Aharonov and Bohm (1959): the phase shift of inter-
ference pattern is explained as occurring without any forces and transferred
quantities. But it has to be noticed that this explanation is not the only
one. There are discussions about the possibility of explaining the phase shift
as a force-based effect. In this section, we make clear the consequences of
this approach for the transference theory of causation.8
In several papers, Boyer (2000a, 2000b, 2006) proposes to explain the
Aharonov-Bohm phase shift, i.e. the shift of the interference pattern, as
an effect of electromagnetic forces. In a nutshell, there is an induced elec-
tromagnetic force between the passing charged particle and the solenoid.
The exact forces are difficult to calculate, involving several particules and
second order relativistic effects. Nevertheless, Boyer provides convincing
arguments that could explain the Aharonov-Bohm phase shift as a force-
based effect. More precisely, he shows that the Aharonov-Bohm phase shift
might be recovered if we take into account these induced effects. Moreover,
he stresses that his explanation is empirically distinguishable of the usual
one. Unlike the standard predictions of the Aharonov-Bohm effect, induced
7We point out that this question is still controversial: see (Bunge 2015).
8We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for pointing us to this debate.
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forces change the velocities of particules and their relative displacement. As
a consequence, there might be experiments that could discriminate between
the two explanations of the phase shift. Also, if Boyer’s explanation were
confirmed, the Aharonov-Bohm phase shift would not be viewed any longer
as a counter-example of the transference theory of causation. However, as
Boyer points out, there has been no such crucial experiments: “at present
the only experimental evidence we have is the Aharonov-Bohm phase shift
itself, and this phase shift is indistinguishable from those due to classical
electromagnetic forces”(2000a, p. 898).
If Boyer is right, the Aharonov-Bohm phase shift implies the transference
of linear momentum and kinetic energy between the solenoid and the passing
particles. In consequence, it would not constitute a counter-example to
the transference theory. But, in the meantime, since we are interested in
“saving” the transference theory against possible objections, we focus on
the most pessimistic option, the one for which there is no transmission of
conserved quantities. This corresponds to the mainstream explanation of
the Aharonov-Bohm phase shift.
4 The AB effect as a paradigmatic case of causal-
ity
Having discussed in what sense no transferred quantities might be involved
in the AB phase shift, we now argue that the AB effect is still a paradigmatic
case of a causal phenomenon.
First of all, we notice that the AB effect is generally described by philoso-
phers as well as physicists with the vocabulary of causality. One precisely
talks about the AB “effect” with regard to this quantum phenomenon un-
like, for example, the EPR “experiment”. It is indeed usual to describe
the AB effect as the effect of an enclosed magnetic field on an interference
pattern.9 For instance, according to Healey, the AB effect involves a kind
of causal relation, revealed by his use of the the word ‘alter’:
As noted by Aharonov (1959), quantum mechanics predicts that
the interference pattern produced by a beam of charged particles
may be altered by the presence of a constant magnetic field, even
though that field is confined to a region from which the particles
are excluded. (Healey 1997, p. 19. Our emphasis.)
9We point out that, unlike this usual way of speaking, Bunge (2015, p. 132) claims
that the AB effect is not really an effect.
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Liu makes even clearer the idea that the AB effect lies on a causal relation:
Roughly put, the AB effect unequivocally shows that there exists
physical interaction between the electromagnetic potential and
charged microscopic objects. [...] ∆S = (S1 − S2) [our ∆δ =
δ1 − δ2, i.e., Eq. (5)] is the phase difference that causes the
fringe shift. [...] Since the wave packets can never enter the
solenoid nor can the B-field ever get out, if there is interaction
between B and the electrons, it has to be action at a distance.
Barring such action (a natural thing to do), the fringe shift must
be caused by the interaction between A and the electrons. (Liu
1994, p. 989-990. Our emphases.)
And similarly, as we have seen, Zangari emphasizes that:
It therefore seems that the term which correctly characterizes
the causal interaction in the Aharonov-Bohm effect is the phase
factor. (1992, p. 269)
However, the concept of causality on which the AB effect is based is still
unclear. Healey (1997), Liu (1994), Zangari (1992) – among others – aim at
describing in a physicalistic framework what happens in the AB effect. But,
they do not tackle the very concept of causality to which their discussions
refer. In Section 5, we shall offer such an account for causality in which the
AB effect is embedded. But, before that, let us reinforce the idea that the
AB effect should be viewed as causal.
In our opinion, the AB effect should be viewed as a causal phenomenon
for mainly this reason: signaling or information can be sent via the AB
effect. We stress this criterion since it allows us to contrast the AB effect
with EPR experiments. Indeed, in the counterfactual approach to causation
EPR experiments and the AB are not clearly distinguished. “Signaling” is
not a novel criterion to argue for causal relations. Salmon already claimed
that “it seems natural to refer to the genuine processes as “causal processes”,
for it is by virtue of the ability of such processes to transmit causal influences
that they can transmit signals or information”(1997, p. 194). Even if we
cannot provide here a definitive analysis of the AB effect from a signaling
perspective, we make a first step towards this direction.
For that purpose, we suggest a very simple device for sending information
with the AB effect. Let us take the two-slit experiments with, initially, no
enclosed magnetic field in the solenoid – or no current in the solenoid. We
have a bright fringe in the middle of the screen. Let us associate the state
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of the interference pattern to “0” (see Fig. 2a). Let us now apply a current
in the solenoid in such a way that the interference pattern is shifted and
a dark fringe is in the middle (Fig. 2b). Let us associate this state of
the interference pattern to “1”. With this code, it is thus possible to send
a series of “0” and “1” from the solenoid to the screen.10 In that sense,
“signaling” is possible with the AB effect.
Further features might be required to argue that the AB effect allows sig-
naling. If one adopts Salmon’s view, one might require having a continuous
process that transmit information. We thus should be able to ensure that
all the information transmitted is in principle already available before the
electrons arrive at the screen.11 At this stage of our analysis, we do not see
how to guarantee that such a criterion would be uncontroversially satisfied.
Nevertheless, the AB experiment can be realized with a screen closer to the
slits, with a distance l′ < l for instance (see Fig. 1). One would thus be
able to send information with the same device at a different distance. How
so? Because electrons have a continuous dynamics between the slits and the
screen. There might be issues related to the status of quantum trajectories
of electrons. But we stress that one deals here with a dynamic phenomenon,
viz. the motion of electrons, which obeys to the Schro¨dinger equation. This
is very different from the EPR experiments, which do not involve dynamics
of electrons.
From this analysis, one might argue that the AB effect is actually an
example of the transference theory since information is transmitted. But we
stress that two notions are involved in the transference theory of causation:
“transmission” and “conserved quantities”. Although one can argue that
information is transmitted, we emphasize that information is not a physical
quantity that satisfies laws of conservation. As Kistler makes clear, “infor-
mation is not transmitted in the physical sense required for the existence
of causal relations because it does not obey to a conservation law” (2006,
p. 233).12 Similarly Lupher, who lists the 13 physical quantities associated
with conservation laws in current scientific theory, does not mention infor-
mation in the list (2009, p. 72). For that reason, one cannot view the AB
effect as a genuine case of the transference theory.
Let us continue to contrast the AB effect with the EPR experiments.
10We could object that it is not possible to send two “0” since it is the same state. One
can easily refine this protocol either by imposing a time sequence or by introducing a third
state, for which the intensity of the fringe is between maximum and minimum, and take
it as the neutral state from which one can either go to 0 or to 1.
11We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this feature.
12See also Kistler (1998, p. 21).
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Although one can doubt that the EPR experiments challenge the transfer-
ence theory of causation, one should not view the AB effect as the same
kind. First of all, it is unclear due to entanglement whether a single system
or two systems occur in EPR experiments. Second, no information can be
transmitted via these experiments, since no signal with finite speed can be
transferred. Change in EPR experiment is based on quantum measurement
– which is instantaneous – and not on a physical interaction described by
a field, a tensor or another agent of interaction. As Zangari (1992) stresses
this contrast:
In the EPR case, strict locality is violated because the determi-
nation of an eigenvalue (i.e., the fixing of a kinematical quantity
by measurement) associated with a particle at one point simulta-
neously determines the eigenvalue of another particle at a distant
point. Since no time passes for a signal to propagate between
the two particles, the correlation cannot be maintained by local
degrees of freedom that satisfy strict locality. [...] By contrast,
a non-local field-effect interpretation of the Aharonov-Bohm ex-
periment has nothing to do with the measurement problem and
would require the abandonment of locality, even while the system
is “smoothly evolving” (i.e., described by Schro¨dinger’s equa-
tion), rather than undergoing measurement. (Zangari 1992, p.
268)
The kind of non-locality involved with the AB effect is very different from
the one in the EPR experiment. The interaction is described in a non-
local way but nonetheless there is still a kind of locality since the electrons
evolve according to Schro¨dinger’s equation and do not require instantaneous
change. Frisch (2005) also points out that the non-locality of the interaction
within the AB effect is nevertheless compatible with a local propagation:
Even though the phase factors are “spread out” through space,
changes in their values do not propagate instantaneously. Since
the vector potential propagates at a finite speed, the phase factor
around paths far away from a disturbance in the field will change
only after a finite time, when the disturbance has reached at least
some point on the path. (Frisch 2005, p. 83)
Like the electromagnetic field, the potential vector satisfies a propagation
equation with a finite speed. Even if it is not a physical quantity – because
of its gauge non-invariance – a change of it that modifies S(C) does not
imply an instantaneous change of S(C).
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Before offering a new physicalist account for a causation in which the AB
effect is embedded, let us go back to Salmon’s original physicalist approach
of causation. Salmon (1980) himself seems to leave open the possibility
that a causal interaction might happen without transference of a physical
quantity:
When two causal processes intersect and suffer lasting modifica-
tions after the intersection, there is some correlation between the
changes which occur in them. In many cases – and perhaps all –
energy and/or momentum transfer occurs, and the correlations
between the modifications are direct consequences of the respec-
tive conservation laws. (Salmon 1980, p. 60. Our emphasis.)
Salmon cautiously claims that, “in many cases”, and not in “all cases”,
the correlation between the changes which occur when two causal processes
intersect corresponds to the transfer of a conserved quantity. According to
us, the AB effect is precisely such a phenomenon that cannot be denied
as causal even if no conserved quantity is transmitted. Let us now make
clear how such a phenomenon can be embedded in a physicalist approach of
causation.
5 Towards a new account for causation
The transference theory of causation seems appropriate in classical contexts.
In other words, in a classical setting, the metaphysical concepts of propaga-
tion and production seem, in most cases, well implemented by the notions
of causal process and causal interaction. But the AB effect is a typically
quantum effect with no classical equivalent. In the light of this observa-
tion, in order to incorporate all past successes, our goal, in this section,
is to propose an extension, or more precisely a variation, of the theory of
transference. This extension will be developed in two steps:
1. We replace the transference theory by a theory of causality based on
the notion of interaction. This step will already expand the domain of
physical processes that should be considered causal. However, it will
be a conservative extension. All previous cases of causal relations will
remain causal.
2. We expand the interactionist theory to include a modal aspect that
will provide a sufficient base to model quantum causal processes.
In the last part of this section, we show how the AB effect is causal in this
new causal framework.
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5.1 Elements of alternative causal approaches
From an ontic or physicalist causal point of view, the AB effect has been
explained in three ways:
1. The effect involves some kind of action at a distance from a local entity.
2. The effect is the result of the local action of a local entity, possibly a
field.
3. The effect is the result of the local action of nonlocal entities or prop-
erties (Healey 2007, chapter 4).13
Let us briefly examine each of these possibilities. A natural way to imple-
ment the first option is to postulate that the charges confined in the solenoid
act at a distance on electrons. Since the AB does not imply a transmission
of energy, this causal relation does not violate the principle of local con-
servation of energy. Moreover, it has been shown in classical physics that
an electromagnetic theory based on such an interaction can be formulated
in such a way that it is empirically equivalent to the electrodynamics the-
ory with a field (Wheeler and Feynman 1949).14 At a first glance, it seems
possible to extend this formulation to quantum physics. There is however
a difficulty to this approach. In order to guarantee the local conservation
of energy, we have to restrict the action at a distance to quantum phenom-
ena like the AB effect. We will still have to add a field to the ontology to
carry the energy during other kinds of interaction. To avoid this ontological
inflation we could simply renounce to local conservation of energy, not a
surprising position in the context of an action-at-a-distance theory.
A more problematic aspect of this conception is that even in the classical
case this theory will be indeterministic in the Laplacian sense. Indeed, a
complete description of the actual positions and momenta of all the charges
is not sufficient to compute the future states. In order to save Laplacian
determinism we have to add to the description of the state information
13It is important to mention that these are causal interpretations of the effect. The
effect itself can be predicted using a diversity of models; using the gauge field or not,
using the electromagnetic tensor or not, etc. See for example (DeWitt 1962). The goal of
a causal interpretation is to identify the physical process these models try to represent.
We thank an anonymous referee for this clarification.
14The main difference between these theories is that in the Wheeler and Feynman’s
approach there is no action of the charges upon themselves. Since this action is never
verified without the use of an another charge, for all practical applications the theory
with a field and the theory without a field are empirically equivalent.
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about previous positions and momenta that could have a retarded impact.15
This makes it very difficult to build a convincing causal implementation of
the concepts of propagation and production that could be extended to the
quantum realm.
The second option is a no go. As argued in (Healey 2007) and (Guay
2008b), we have reasons to believe that it is impossible, in the context of
quantum physics, to define an ontologically plausible local bearer of electro-
magnetic interaction that would act locally. Either the bearer is not really
gauge invariant (Leeds 1999) or it comes to choose a true gauge among all
equivalent ones. This latter option is exemplified by the Lie´nard–Wiechert
potential field C. These potentials, such as B = ∇ × C, “are completely
definite and defined purely in terms of intrinsic, local properties” (Mat-
tingly 2006, p. 246). This still raises the question of why one should choose
this gauge among the other ones. In particular, C is still not empirically
mesurable. Therefore, without strong philosophical reasons to choose it, this
choice seems arbitrary. To model the AB effect as causal, some nonlocality
or nonseparability seems unavoidable. Since these arguments are now well
known, thanks to Healey, we will not discuss this point further.
The third option is more promising. For example, Healey (2007) ar-
gued that holonomies, understood as nonseparable processes, act locally
on electrons. This interpretation can be extended to the classical realm.
Holonomies propagate in conformity to the relativistic causality condition
and allow local conservation of energy. Without denying the main insight
of the holonomy interpretation, we have to assume that this proposition is
not conservative. All previous cases of transference causation have to be
reinterpreted as the effect of a nonseparable process. This bold move would
be justified if this approach could increase substantially our comprehension
of quantum causality. However this does not seem to be the case. From a
causal point of view the local action of a non-local entity is not easily distin-
guishable from action at a distance. In the next subsection, we reinterpret
the holonomy solution in a manner that will accommodate equally classical
and quantum phenomena.
5.2 An interactionist account of causality in classical physics
In order to have a common language between classical and quantum physics,
we will frame this discussion in the Lagrangian formalism. Let us begin by
15It is possible that the Wheeler-Feynman theory is deterministic in an ontological
sense. Indeed we have reasons to believe that under realistic conditions, the solution for
the evolution of charges is unique. For more details, see (Bauer, Deckert and Du¨rr 2013).
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causation in classical cases. Once the variables describing states in the
phase space are chosen, each system is characterised by Φ, the set of all
possible histories. Φ includes the histories that satisfy and those that do
not satisfy the dynamical equations (more on this below). On this set we
can define a functional, the action S : Φ → R, that will determine all the
dynamical properties of the system. Indeed, between an initial state in, a
certain state at a certain time, and a final state out, the physical history, the
one that actually takes place (if it exists), is the one minimising S.16 Let us
assume that the dynamical equations are local in time, i.e. involving no time
integrals and a finite number of time derivatives. In a relativistic theory,
this implies that the equations are also local in space.17 These two points
put strong constraints on what the action S could be. We will assume the
common answer: S is the integral of the Lagrange function or Lagrangian,
L, plus boundary terms (DeWitt 2003, chapter 2).18
A few remarks before developing further the causation account. First,
the Lagrangian formalism is part of a global approach of dynamics. Contrary
to a local approach, where the starting points could be possible instanta-
neous states, in the Lagrangian formalism the starting point are possible
histories of the system under study. Histories are extended in space-time.
Second, they are two kinds of possibilities involved in the Lagrangian
formalism: kinematical and dynamical possibilities (Belot 2007). Kinemat-
ical possibilities are possible histories of the system. They consist in all
the ways to map dependent variables describing the states of system based
onto independent variables.19 Together the kinematical possibilities form
the set of possible histories Φ. The dynamical possibilities are a subset of
the kinematical ones. They are the genuine physical histories. They are the
possible histories that are compatible with dynamical laws. These histories
could correspond to situations of the actual world.
It is tempting to associate each kinematical history to a possible world
but this move should be resisted (Belot 2007). For example, a symmetry
could associate a set of kinematical possibilities to the same possible world.
It also possible that certain assumptions made (i.e. locality) are incompat-
ible with other metaphysical claims about possible worlds. In consequence,
16It is a simplification, but it will do here.
17This assumption is not necessary but simplifies greatly the quantization process. For
more details, see (Guay 2008b).
18For reason of simplicity, we will assume that L has an explicit dependence on a fixed
space-time metric.
19In fact there are generally further constraints, for example differentlaibility, but this
does not affect our argument here.
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this direct association should be avoided.
As mentioned above, dynamical possibilities are histories that could hap-
pen according to the actual dynamical laws. They are the closest we have
to actuality. They are a proper subset of kinematical possibilities. There-
fore, there could exist kinematical possibilities that are incompatible with all
dynamical laws. They would be not physically possible histories. Neverthe-
less, the set of kinematical possibilities should not be identified to the set of
metaphysical possibilities. The former is apparently much more constraint
than the later. The exact metaphysical interpretation of the set of kinemat-
ical possibilities will depend on the theory of natural laws sustained. For
example, in the context of a governing law position, in which states can be
defined independently of laws, a kinematical possibility that is not a dynam-
ical possibility can be understood as an history that could have happened
if the laws were different. However, in this context, a kinematical possibil-
ity could not refer to an eventual unlawful history, a history where no laws
apply. We stop here and postpone a detailed discussion on modality in the
Lagrangian formalism to a future paper.
Let us return to the basics of causation: propagation and production. In
a typical Lagrangian we can find terms that describe free propagation and
terms that represent interaction.20 The first, the kinetic terms, describe the
specific way energy is freely transmitted in this system from one location to
another in spacetime. As Einstein argued (1970, p. 61), one of the main
reasons to adopt an ontology in physics is in order to be able to formulate a
reasonable statement of the principle of conservation of energy. In the con-
text of electromagnetic systems discussed above, fields seem unavoidable. So
what we mean by a causal process is the specific propagation process of en-
tities involved in these kinetic terms, for exemple the free motion of charges
or the free propagation of the electromagnetic field. Once we add the inter-
action terms, this picture becomes more complex since the entities identified
in the free case can now interact, for example by exchanging energy. We
have thus, using the interaction terms, a technique to represent the produc-
tive processes in this system. This presumes that the ontology identified in
the free case survives more or less in the interactive case. This simplicity
hypothesis is a good start but should not be assumed to always work, es-
pecially in the relativistic quantum case (Earman and Fraser 2006). The
possibility of interaction can change the identity of the ontological entities
identified in a non-interactive context. We have now a way to characterise
each possible history, the propagation and the production story. If we want
20More on this below.
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to know the causal story of the actual history of the system, we apply this
analysis to the particular history that minimises the action.
In summary, our revised version of the transference theory of classical
causation:
CQ1’. A causal process is a continuous (or almost continuous)
series of spacetime events governed by kinetic terms in L, con-
serving basic quantities, like energy.
CQ2’. A causal interaction is a way the causal processes can
interact with each other. This interaction is governed by the
interaction terms of L.
We claim that the above described implementation is able to integrate
all cases successfully analyzed by the transference theory of causation. Each
case of causal process in the theory of transference, world line of a system
that possesses a conserved quantity, can be described by a Lagrangian with
only kinetic terms. The fact that this process in spacetime conserves energy
or other quantities is the result of the particular structure of the dynamics
of the system (the structure of the set of possible histories Φ and how is
encoded the dynamics, the Lagrangian L). Each case of causal interaction
in the usual theory, an intersection of world lines that involves exchange
of a conserved quantity, is captured by specific interaction terms in L. Our
Lagrangian approach manages to reproduce the transference results but also
to extend them since we can capture the free propagation of entities that
do not form clear world line, like fields. We can also model interaction that
does not imply an asymmetrical exchange of a conserved quantity.
To illustrate this interactionist approach, let us apply it to a concrete
example. Let us imagine N mass points interacting via the Newtonian
gravitational force. In this case, the Lagrangian is
L =
N∑
i=1
miv
2
i
2
−
∑
16i<j6N
Gmimj
‖ −→r i −−→r j ‖ (10)
The first sum represents the kinetic terms. The second sum represents the
gravitational interaction between material points.
According to CQ1’, the kinetic terms determine what are the causal
processes between interaction or more generally in the absence of interaction.
If the dynamic was only governed by these terms the mass points would move
inertially.21 The interaction terms determine how the causal processes are
21For simplicity, we presume here that no collision would occur.
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transformed. In this case all interactions are symmetric. In other words, L is
not modified by indices permutation. It means that at a fundamental level
there is no asymmetry in the causal interaction between material points.
We can however in certain conditions obtain asymmetric causal claims. For
example, if one of the points has a mass disproportionally bigger than all
the others, we could justify the claim that this point is causally dominant.
We can also explore how the dynamics would change if we modify the initial
conditions or the values of the masses. This way we could even quantify
roughly how this special material point is dominating the general behavior
of the system.
In the context of Hamiltonian mechanics, Zangari (1992) has already
made clear that asymmetric causal explanations –e.g., the fact that the
change of atmospherical pressure casually explains the change of the value
of the barometer, and not conversely– are compatible with symmetric inter-
action terms. He emphasized that the number of degrees of freedom of each
system is decisive to obtain a causal dependance even if the interaction term
is symmetric:
In general, interaction terms determine the degree of “causal de-
pendence” between interacting systems. In a loose sense, causal
dependence can be quantified as a function of both the relative
number of degrees of freedom from each system that contribute
to the interaction, and the strength of the coupling between
them. Roughly speaking, [...] only a very small number of the
atmosphere [degrees of freedom] are involved in its interaction
with the barometer. (Zangari 1992, p. 263)
We stress here that this interactionist account allows us to embed sys-
tems at equilibrium as displaying causal relations (See Section 2.2). In the
case previously mentioned, of a ring and a mass point at its center, although
the net force is zero, there is a gravitational potential and thus an interac-
tion term in the Lagrangian, which reflects the causal relation between the
two bodies.
Yet, given an arbitrary Lagrangian, can we always distinguish between
kinetic and interaction terms? We do not have a general answer to this
question. Nevertheless, we have a partial answer for a vast and useful class
of systems: the natural ones. A Lagrangian system is called natural if its
Lagrangian is equal to the difference between kinetic and potential energy.
In these cases, the kinetic terms correspond to the quadratic form on each
tangent space of the Riemannian manifold associated to the phase space
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(Arnold 1989). Unless we have reason to believe the contrary, all other
terms should be considered as interaction terms.22
Still, what about Lagrangians that are not natural, like the Einstein-
Hilbert Lagrangian or the pure Chern-Simons Lagrangian? Our understand-
ing is that in these cases causal interpretation is difficult independently of the
conception of causality assumed. For example, even if the Einstein-Hilbert
Lagrangian is apparently well behaved, the fact that the formulation of an
associated Hamiltonian is far to be trivial (I am referring here to the famous
problem of time in general relativity) is a sign that the meaning of propa-
gation and production is not obvious. For the simple reason that the notion
of change itself is not trivial. In the same vein, a Lagrangian that contains
only Chern-Simons terms can represent certain aspects of a physical situ-
ation (i.e. the fractional quantum Hall effect). However, it is too poor to
describe the dynamics of such quantum fluid if it is not very close to the
ground state. If we enrich this Lagrangian to do so, we obtain a natural
Lagrangian. We make the hypothesis that most of these problematic cases
have similar roots. Either their dynamics is problematic and they can be
considered not causal or they are approximations.
5.3 Feynman’s functional integrals as a means for defining
physical causation
How to move from this classical analysis to what it means to propagate and
produce in quantum contexts? As already mentioned, one possibility is to
follow Healey and keep the idea of a local action but allow nonlocal entities
in order to represent the surprising aspects of quantum propagation and
production. This option seems to us too little and at the same time too
much. Too much in the sense that it does not preserve much of the classical
version of causal process and interaction. Too little in the sense that it does
not adequately account for the peculiarities of the quantum realm. It is still
attached to a classical conception of what it is to act. This conception of
classical action comes from classical physics, from the fact that world line
of bodies or field propagations can be well defined. Quantum physics does
not easily accommodate such an ontology.
To justify one or the other of the available quantum ontologies is be-
yond the objective of this paper. Rather we intend to develop a physicalist
conception of causation that will apply generally. One trend we can follow
from the classical to the quantum is to notice that this passage consists in
22In consequence, topological terms (terms that do not depend on the the spacetime
metric) can have a causal effect, even if they do not involve energy transfer.
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the replacement of the Hamilton functions and a phase space by transition
amplitudes and an Hilbert space (Rovelli and Vidotto 2015). The Hamilton
function S(in, out) is defined as the value of the action on the physical his-
tory (if it exists) between in and out states, certain phase space states at
certain specific times.23 In the Feynman’s functional formalism, a transition
amplitude, between in and out states,24 takes, in general, the form of in the
DeWitt’s condensed notation (Guay 2008b):
〈out|in〉 =
∫
eiS[ϕ]µ[ϕ][dϕ], [dϕ] :=
∏
i
dϕi, (11)
where S is the action of the particular history of the entities represented by
ϕ, µ[ϕ] plays the role of a volume density in the space of histories Φ and i is
a general indice for all components of all entities (particles, fields...).25 The
transition amplitude is an integral that runs over possible histories. Each
history contributes according to its action.
In classical physics, only histories that minimise the action are physically
relevant. It is why we generally do not speak of probability in these cases.
Between a state in and a state out, the physical history (if it exists) has a
probability of 1. The other kinematical possibilities 0. In quantum physics,
this is no longer the case. All possible histories are potentially conjointly
responsible for the physical phenomenon. It is why this should be qualified
as a physicalist modal conception of causation. To illustrate this proposition,
we would like to discuss an interesting disanalogy. Let us imagine a machine
M1 that when receiving a 0 gives a 0 and another machine M2 that gives
a 1 in the same condition. We feed them both 0 and combine the result
with an addition machine. Here we face an ordinary case of ontic causation,
each machine consisting in a single causal process. These causal processes
interact (in the addition machine) and a new process is generated. Let
us now imagine that we have a single quantum machine. Each possible
way the machine can process 0 is counted according to a certain protocol
(addition). These ways to vote generate a result in the actual world. As
in the first case, the dependance between the result and the machines is
clear. However, the causal interpretation is different. In the classical case,
the entire process of both machines is in the same causal regime. In the
quantum case, only our world is quantum, the other possible histories are
23The Hamilton function is a complex mathematical object. See (Littlejohn 1992) for
more details on its relation to the geometry of the phase space.
24In the context of a transition amplitude in and out do not represent classical states,
but associated eigenstates of appropriate operators.
25For simplicity, we assume c = ~ = 1.
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classical. Nevertheless, they contribute causally to what happen in our
world. While what happens in our world depends on what happens in other
possible classical histories, the reverse is not true. We can imagine many
cases, where there is no empirical difference between the result produced
by a series of parallel classical causal processes and a modal sum of such
processes. But this will not always be the case. Let us imagine that M2 is not
physically possible according to the dynamical laws. In this situation, the
classical process and the quantum one will not provide the same output for
the same input. The quantum process will still give 1 if feeding a 0 to M2 and
obtaining 1 is a possible process (a kinematical possibility). Apparently, the
quantum machines give us an result classically impossible. In this context, it
is not surprising that we would infer the existence of strange interaction. But
we have to be careful. In this framework, the nonlocality is not necessarily
the result of the action of non-local entities in our world. It could be the
product of how the specific contributions of classical local causal processes
are added. As an example, see the AB effect in the next subsection.
Let us summarize our proposition. In classical physics, we propose to
identify causal process, propagation, by analysing kinetic terms of the La-
grangian. Causal interactions, which do not always reduce to the exchange
of conserved quantity, are characterised by the interaction terms in the La-
grangian. The analysis can be applied to any element of the space of histories
Φ. However the history that is actualised, knowing initial and final condi-
tions, is, if it exists, the one that minimises the action, in other words the
value of the Hamilton function S(in, out).
In quantum physics, the Hamilton function S(in, out) is replaced by
the transition amplitude 〈out|in〉. The transition amplitudes are directly
dependent on the action of each possible classical history between in and
out. This dependence is formalized by the functional integral (Eq. 11). In
our account of causation, a quantum causal process is the modal functional
addition of classical causal process. In consequence, quantum causation
is radically different from classical causation. However, there is a strong
continuity between classical and quantum causation. For example, possible
histories that are close to the actual classical one contribute constructively
to the transition amplitude (MacKenzie 2000).
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5.4 The causal interpretation of the Aharonov-Bohm effect
In the case of the AB effect, the transition amplitude takes the form of a
Feynman propagator.26 In particular, this propagator takes the form of an
integral over all possible trajectories from in to out, 〈out|in〉 = ∫ D(~q(t))eiS[~q(t)],
where S is the classical action associated with path ~q. With the free par-
ticle case as a reference, the action of the electromagnetic interaction is to
multiply the contribution of each path ~q (of each possible history) by a non-
integrable phase factor U(out, in) = e−ie
∫
q Aµdx
µ
(called a Wilson line). If
we compute the relative effect of the electromagnetic interaction on two his-
tories, we obtain an holonomy (or a Dirac phase factor) already discussed
above.
We could interpret these holonomies, as Healey does, as some kind of
causal process in itself. More precisely as characterizing the local effect (the
observed pattern of electrons’ impact) of nonlocal electromagnetic proper-
ties. Of course this interpretation has important consequences on classical
electromagnetic causality because the existence of these new properties has
to be taken into account when we discuss the local effect of the classical lo-
cal electromagnetic field. For us, the holonomies illustrate how the classical
causal electromagnetic stories combine to generate the quantum causal pro-
cess. In the end, both interpretations agree on the central role of holonomies.
So what is at stake? To clarify this point we concentrate on the status of
nonlocality. For Healey, the nonlocality of electromagnetism is an ontologi-
cal fact concerning properties. Nonlocal electromagnetic properties actually
exist. For us, it is quite possible that the apparent nonlocality in a quantum
phenomenon is the modal result of the addition of local processes generated
by local properties. This interpretation has no impact on classical causal
analyses. No nonlocal causally powerful entity is necessary to explain the
effect. We must only accept that distinct possible classical histories can be
causally relevant at the same time.
The AB effect is a good example of this last point. The classical action
of a charged particle on a path ~q is modified by turning on the current in
the solenoid in the following way:
S[~q(t)]→ S[~q(t)]− e
∫
q
Aµdx
µ (12)
Classically, the new term has no impact. It adds the same constant to all
trajectories that go in the same slit. The difference between the constant
26In this context, the Feynman propagator is the transition amplitude that a charged
particle be present at a space-time point out if it was at in.
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added to the top trajectories and the ones passing in the lower one (see Fig
1) is proportional to the electromagnetic flux in the solenoid. Computing
the Euler-Lagrange equations shows that if a trajectory is not passing in a
region where Fµν 6= 0, these constants make no dynamical difference. How-
ever, they should not be eliminated, since up to a gauge transformation,
they describe the local properties of the electromagnetic flux. The quan-
tum case is a different matter. Since all possible histories contribute to the
phenomenon, the differences between these constants is causally significant.
Thus the local properties of the enclosed electromagnetic field are contribut-
ing, not through an action at a distance, but in a modal way. This difference
among classical histories is making the diffraction pattern shift. Nonlocality
is the result of modality.
6 Conclusion
We claimed that the traditional transference theory of causation fails to ac-
count for the Aharonov-Bohm effect. None of the usual physical conserved
quantities discussed in the literature, viz. momentum, angular momentum,
energy, and spin, are transferred within this effect. Yet this effect is a
paradigmatic case of causal phenomenon. In agreement with experimental
results, it is possible to modify the interference pattern by changing contin-
uously the magnetic field, allowing us in principle to send information from
the solenoid to the screen.
We then argued for an extension of the traditional transference theory in
order to embed the Aharonov-Bohm effect. The holonony or phase factor,
which is the responsible for this quantum effect, is not strictly speaking
a transferred quantity since there is no propagation of it. It is a non-local
quantity. We thus offered a new version of traditional transference theory for
which holonomies are the consequences of combined propagating processes.
For that purpose, we interpreted the electrons’ possible trajectories within
Feynman’s functional integrals formulation of quantum electrodynamics and
deemed them to be propagating processes. In order to recover holonomies,
all the possible paths have to be taken into account. This leads us to a
modal extension of transference theory for which the Aharonov-Bohm effect
is the result of the addition of possible causal processes.
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